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The Effect of Due Process on
Criminal Defense Discovery
By BABmY NAxEr.L*
In a recent article dealing with the constitutional issues
raised by discovery in criminal cases,' I wrote that "[i]t is con-
stitutionally as important that a defendant be informed of the
evidence as it is that he be informed of his rights."2 The Supreme
Court has been signalling that it might prefer to develop within
the criminal process doctrines that focus on fairness in ascertaining
the guilt or innocence of the accused3 rather than rules that utilize
the criminal process to control police conduct but which ad-
mittedly impede the search for truth to protect other values.
Since criminal defense discovery, like civil discovery, is designed
to improve the fact-finding process at trial,4 it is a prime candidate
for increasingly favorable attention from the Court. In a series
of decisions culminating last term in Wardius v. OregonP and
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,6 the Court announced embryonic due pro-
cess 7 principles for establishing the two critical devices of de-
fense discovery-file disclosure and depositions."
FE DIsCLOSURE
The Supreme Court has long favored defense discovery in
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1 Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The De-
veloping Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437 (1972) [hereinaftercited a, Nakell].
2 Id. at 450.
3 E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 2063-64, 2067, 2072
(1973) (concurring opinion); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
4 See Nakell 437 472.
5 93 S.Ct. 2208 (1973).
6 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973).
7 In addition to general due process, the specific provisions of the sixth
amendment, giving a defendant the rights "to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense," all "speak to an underlying constitutional policy of
broad discovery." Nakell 462-69.
8 See id. at 450, 469, 471, 472-74.
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criminal casesY Until its decision in Wardius v. Oregon, however,
the Court had established only two narrow constitutional prin-
ciples for implementing such discovery. The first principle is:
it constitutes a violation of due process of law for law en-
forcement agencies, police or prosecutor, knowingly to present
or let stand uncontradicted false evidence or to withhold
from the defendant, intentionally or not, material exculpatory
evidence of any kind, including evidence useful only for im-
peachment of the credibility of government witnesses."10
The duty of disclosure imposed by this principle has never been
held necessarily to require disclosure before trial.1 Moreover,
disclosure is required only of material evidence that is exculpatory
or favorable to the defendant, and the prosecutor makes the
initial and often the only decision as to which evidence thus
qualifies for disclosure.' 2 The second discovery principle pre-
viously established by the Supreme Court is that "the fundamental
requirements of fairness" provide a defendant with a right to
pre-trial disclosure of the name and address of, and perhaps also
any statements given to the police by, an informer who might
have information relevant to the defendant's guilt or innocence.' 3
The potential for expanding this second principle to include all
material witnesses has not yet been developed.'
4
The Due Process Reciprocity Decision
The issue in Wardius dealt with prosecutorial rather than
defense discovery. In that anomalous setting, the Supreme Court
established a new principle of defense discovery, a principle un-
9 Id. at 451-52. In Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208 (1978), the Court re-
ferred to "the proposition that the ends of justice will best be served by a system of
liberal discovery which gives both parties the maxium possible amount of informa-
tion with which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of
surprise at trial ..... The growth of such discovery devices is a salutory devel-
opment, which by increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the
fairness of the adversary system." Id. at 2211.
10 Nakell 452. The most recent Supreme Court cases discussing this principle
are Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Miller v. Pate, 886 U.S. 1 (1967);
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The principle is referred to in the text
as the Giles-Brady principle.
11 Nakell 452-53.
121d. at 453.
13 Compare Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) with McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); see Nakell 461-62.
14 See Nakell 462.
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likely to remain confined within the context of its promulgation.
The case arose in Oregon, which has a statute that requires a
defendant who proposes to rely on an alibi defense to advise the
prosecuting attorney in advance of trial of the places where he
claims to have been at the time of the crime and the names and
addresses of all his alibi witnesses. 15 The Court had already
upheld a Florida notice-of-alibi provision against fifth amend-
ment challenge in Williams v. Florida.16 Florida law, however,
provided criminal defendants with broad discovery rights, 7 and
specifically provided a defendant who had complied with the
notice-of-alibi rule reciprocal discovery of the prosecutor's rebuttal
witnesses to the alibi defense.' By contrast, Oregon limits
defense discovery to written statements given to the police by the
defendant and by prosecution witnesses, and no reciprocal alibi
discovery is provided.'9 Because of this deficiency, the Supreme
Court unanimously struck down enforcement of this Oregon
notice-of-alibi statute against the petitioner as violative of due
process .
20
The Court opened its opinion with the statement that "[t]he
case involves important questions concerning the right of a
defendant forced to comply with a 'notice-of-alibi rule' to recipro-
cal discovery."2' The Court did not, however, order that the
15 OnE. REv. STAT. § 185.875 (Replacement Part 1971).
16399 U.S. 78 (1970). See Nakell 496-516. The rationale of Williams was
severely compromised in the Supreme Court's later decision in Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605 (1972). See Nakell 516 n.382. The Court in Wardius seemed to
assume the continuing validity of Williams. See Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct.
2208, 2210 & n.1 (1973).
17 FLA. R. Caml. P. 1.220.
18 FLA. R. CMm. P. 1.200. The Court observed in Williams that at least six-
teen states have a notice-of-alibi rule. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 n.11
(1972). A California court surveyed other notice-of-alibi statutes in 1970 and
observed that only those of Florida and New Jersey explicitly provided for re-
ciprocal discovery. Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 496-97, 88
Cal. Rptr. 154, 155-56 (1970).
19 Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2210, 2212 n.7 & 8 (1973).
20 Id. at 2211.
l2 1 Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2210 (1973). In Williams the Court
held:
We need not linger over the suggestion that the discovery permitted the
State against petitioner in this case deprived him of 'due process' or a
'fair trial.' Florida law provides for liberal discovery by the defendant
against the State, and the notice-of-alibi rule is itself carefully hedged
with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure to the defendant."
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1972).
The Court also observed in a footnote that it was not deciding
whether notice-of-alibi rules other than Florida's are "necessarily valid in
(Continued on next page)
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defendant be given discovery, but rather held that it was con-
stitutional error to enforce the sanctions22 of the rule against
the defendant in the absence of reciprocal discovery.23 Neverthe-
less, given the increasing popularity of notice-of-alibi statutes and
other kinds of prosecutorial discovery, formal and informal,24
the decision should prove to be a significant constitutional impetus
to defense discovery.
25
The heart of the Court's decision was expressed in the fol-
lowing language:
[W]e do hold that in the absence of a strong showing of state
interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street.
The State may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for
truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while main-
taining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses. It is funda-
mentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the de-
tails of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to
the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces
of evidence which he disclosed to the State.
26
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
all respects; that conclusion must await a specific context and an inquiry,
for example, into whether the defendant enjoys reciprocal discovery
against the State." Id. at 82 n.1.
22The Oregon statute provided that "If the defendant fails to fie and serve
such notice, he shall not be permitted to introduce alibi evidence at the trial of
the cause unless the court for good cause orders otherwise." ORE. REv. STAT. §
135.875(1) (Replacement Part 1971). The defendant in Wardius called one other
witness and himself to support his alibi defense, and the trial court refused to
allow the testimony of either because the defendant had failed to file the required
notice of alibi. This sanction itself raises important constitutional questions. See
Nakell 494 n.303; Note, The Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional
Right to Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342 (1972). The Court in Wardius
declined to reach that question. Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2211, n.4
(1978). The Court in Williams held that it did not arise in that case since the
defendant made the required disclosure and thus no sanctions had been applied.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83, n.14 (1970).23 Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208 2211 (1973).
24Id. at 2211; FED. R. Cnat. P. 16(c); ABA ADvIsORY Conwrr= ON PaE-
TmIAL PnocEEDNrcs, STANDARDS IRELATING To DIscovERY AND PRocEDuRE BEFORE
TnrALs 3-6 (Supp. Oct. 1970).
25 The evidence subject to disclosure under Wardius would not likely be
evidence that the prosecutor must disclose to the defendant under any other due
process principle. Because the evidence subject to disclosure is the prosecutor's
alibi rebuttal evidence, the prosecutor would surely not consider it exculpatory or
favorable to the defendant. Thus it would not be subject to disclosure under the
Brady-Giles principle. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
Also, the evidence would not ordinarily be the testimony of an informer,
otherwise his cover and with it his usefulness to law enforcement would be de-
stroyed. Unless Roviaro is interpreted to apply to all material witnesses, therefore,
its principle of fundamental fairness would not generally compel disclosure in the
Wardius circumstances. See text at notes 13 and 14 supra.2 6 Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212-13 (1973). In Williams, the Court
(Continued on next page)
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What is the scope of discovery a state must afford a criminal
defendant under Wardius in order to enforce a notice-of-alibi
rule? The Court acknowledged in both Williams27 and Wardius28
that Florida provided liberal discovery independently of the
notice-of-alibi rule as well as reciprocal discovery in the notice-
of-alibi rule itself. Would a state have to provide the full scope
of Florida's liberal discovery before it could demand that the
defendant disclose the names of his alibi witnesses? Wardius
does not clearly answer that question, but the language of the
opinion suggests that it might be sufficient for a state to reciprocate
with discovery relating solely to the alibi defense since the Court
regularly characterized the discovery that must be provided as
"reciprocal discovery. 29 Also, in describing the unfairness giving
rise to the due process violation, the Court said that it consisted
of the state's compelling a defendant to disclose some of his
evidence "while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of
surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence
which he disclosed to the State."30 Finally, in comparing the dis-
covery laws of Florida and Oregon, the Court observed: "Oregon
grants no discovery rights to criminal defendants . . . . More
significantly, Oregon . . . has no provision which requires the
State to reveal the names and addresses of witnesses it plans to
use to refute an alibi defense."31
If these quotations are clues that only narrow "tit-for-tat" alibi
discovery is needed to meet the demands of due process, the
scope of the required discovery is still uncertain since there are
two categories of evidence that a prosecutor might use to defeat
an alibi defense. One category of evidence directly contradicts
the alibi. Such evidence would include testimony by witnesses
that they were at the place the defendant claimed to be at the
(Footnote continued from precedin page)
said: "The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker
game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until
played. We find ample room in that system, at least as far as 'due process' is con-
cerned, for the instant Florida rule, which is designed to enhance the search for
truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample
opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or
innocence.' Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 1972).
27 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 n.9 (1972).28 Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212 (1973).
29 Id. at 2210, 2211, 2213, 2214.
30 Id. at 2213 (emphasis added).
a1 Id. at 2212 (emphasis added).
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time he claimed to be there and that he was not there. It would
also include records ordinarily kept of persons visiting the place
of the alibi which fail to reflect the presence of the defendent
at the time of the crime. The prosecutor might also challenge the
credibility of the defendant's alibi witnesses by any of the usual
impeachment methods, including the use of prior inconsistent
statements, prior felony convictions, or evidence of strong friend-
ship between the witness and the defendant. Wardius would
certainly require the prosecution to disclose all such evidence-or
at least the names and addresses of all witnesses through whom
it intends to produce such evidence-to a defendant who has,
under compulsion of state law, notified the prosecution of an alibi
defense he intends to raise. The scope of Wardius is less certain,
however, as it relates to the second category of alibi rebuttal
evidence.
The second and more common category indirectly attacks the
alibi by showing that at the time of the crime the defendant was
present at the scene of the crime, thus precluding the defendant's
presence elsewhere. Even if the prosecutor has no evidence
directly contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the de-
fendant's alibi witnesses, he could refute their testimony by
presenting eyewitnesses who identify the defendant as attending
and perhaps even committing the crime, or who identify his car
as having been in the neighborhood of the crime at the time of
its commission. The prosecution could also introduce evidence
that the defendant's fingerprints or footprints or an item of his
clothing or a weapon registered in his name had been found
at the scene of the crime. The weight of this latter evidence, less
conclusive in rebuttal to an alibi because not time-oriented, would
depend on how persuasively the defendant could justify having
left such trails of his presence during some legitimate earlier
visit.
Thus, any evidence tending to establish the defendant as
the perpetrator of the crime would also tend to rebut his alibi.
Even though all of the evidence in this second category might
form part of the prosecution's case-in-chief, it also must be
considered alibi rebuttal evidence. After all, an alibi is only
a defense designed to negative the identification portion of the
prosecutions evidence. That legal taxonomy has identified this
1973]
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defense with a name of its own does not detract from its basic
character as a denial of a critical aspect of the case against the
defendant. Thus, it can be argued that any evidence regarding
the identity of the perpetrator is subject to defense discovery
whenever Wardius is properly invoked.
Support for the position that the second category of rebuttal
evidence must be disclosed is derived from the facts in Wardius
itself. The defendant was convicted of unlawful sale of narcotics.
He tried to show in defense that at the time the alleged trans-
action took place he was at a drive-in movie with a female com-
panion. The trial court rejected all testimony in support of that
defense because of the defendant's failure to give advance notice
to the prosecution. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the
validity of the notice-of-alibi statute, in view of its lack of any
provision for reciprocal defense discovery, was not properly
raised32 because the prosecution presented no rebuttal evidence.
3
The Supreme Court did not respond directly to this basis for the
Oregon court's decision, but it did hold that the defendant was
entitled to raise the issue even though he had not made dis-
closure and thus was not eligible for reciprocal discovery from the
state. The Court evidently reasoned that the trial court's refusal
of the alibi evidence as a sanction for noncompliance with the
notice-of-alibi rule was a sufficient harm to the defendant to
enable him to complain of its non-reciprocal character 4 since
the prosecution might have offered rebuttal evidence if the alibi
testimony had been allowed. Yet the Court might have reasoned
that the prosecution's evidence identifying the defendant as a par-
ticipant in the illegal transaction was the kind of alibi rebuttal
evidence that due process requires to be disclosed to the de-
fendant.
3 2 State v. Wardius, 487 P.2d 1380, 1883 (Ore. 1971); cf. Wardius v. Oregon,
93 S.Ct. 2208, 2211 (1973).
33 It is not, however, necessary for us to decide that question. No
witness was here called nor evidence offered by the state relating to the
question of alibi. Thus, no prejudice is shown....
Thus, we do not find it necessary to decide whether under ORS
185.875 the defendant is entitled to reciprocal discovery rights from the
state.... There has been no denial thereof here.
State v. Wardius, 487 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Ore. 1971).
34 The defendant in Wardius did not claim that his failure to comply with
the notice-of-alibi rule was due to the lack of reciprocal features in the rule. In-
stead, he attempted to excuse his noncompliance by showing that until two days
before the trial he was mistaken as to the date on which the relevant transaction
was alleged to have occurred. State v. Wardius, 487 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Ore. 1971).
[Vol. 69.
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Certainly the fundamental fairness rationale that formed the
basis for the Supreme Court's holding in Wardius supports a dis-
closure requirement for both the direct and indirect categories
of alibi rebuttal evidence. If the defendant is relying on an alibi,
it is equally unfair for the prosecution to surprise him with
rebuttal evidence establishing his presence at the crime sceneO5
as with rebuttal evidence establishing his absence from the alibi
scene or impeaching the credibility of his proffered evidence.
This unfairness is particularly apparent if the prosecution has no
direct rebuttal evidence but, as is often the case, relies solely on
the strengh of its crime-scene evidence, whether used for its
case-in-chief or at a rebuttal stage in the proceedings. In such
a case, the defendant will have to open his defense while the
prosecution discloses nothing: it has no direct rebuttal evidence
and need not disclose its indirect rebuttal evidence. Would it be
fair to require the defendant to disclose his evidence on the issue
of identity (alibi), yet permit the prosecutor to make no dis-
closure even though he plans to introduce considerable evidence
placing the defendant at the crime scene? Allowing the defendant
thus to be "ambushed" 6 by a prosecutor to whom he tipped his
hand under compulsion of state law could not be squared with
the notions of fairness that governed Wardius.
On the other hand, if due process compels a prosecutor to
provide reciprocal alibi discovery of his indirect as well as his
direct rebuttal evidence, a defendant may gain a tactical discovery
opportunity. Merely by serving notice of an alibi defense, a
defendant may be able to discover part of the prosecution's case-
in-chief identifying the defendant as the culprit. Policing bad
faith triggering of the reciprocal discovery obligations of the
prosecuor would be difficult. Because a defendant with even a
weak alibi risks having it denied to him if he fails to give notice
in advance of trial of the possibility of his raising it, every de-
fendant contemplating such a defense will protect its availability
to him by making pre-trial disclosure, and thus entitle himself
to reciprocal discovery. Ultimately, a defendant might be dis-
couraged from relying on his alibi by the strength of the
prosecutions reciprocally revealed rebuttal, by anticipation of
35 See text at notes 55-60 infra.
36 Kaufman Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendantes Own State-
ments in the Federal Courts, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 1113, 1119 (1957).
1973]
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acquittal without it, by lack of witnesses due to faulty memories
or other reasons beyond the control of the defendant, or by a
cautious concern that the defense might backfire because of its
tenuous or ambivalent nature. The line between bona fide in-
vocation of the notice-of-alibi rule and manipulation of the rule
for discovery purposes only may be too fine for detection. To
complicate matters, the pressures on a defendant to disclose any
kind of alibi before trial in order to preserve his right to raise it
at trial would be such as to foreclose, as unreasonable and
oppressive, a requirement that any alibi defense raised before
trial be presented to the judge or jury; and likewise to foreclose,
as unreasonable and oppressive and also violative of the de-
fendant's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 7 any
sanction in the form of comment to the trier of fact that a
defendant who did not present an alibi defense had earlier
pleaded one.
In the final analysis, however, the exploitation potential need
not be of concern. The only tactical advantage obtainable would
be the early discovery of adverse evidence-not an unfair tech-
nical escape from the processes of justice. A due process directive
arising from the commands of fundamental fairness should pre-
fer, where some slippage one way or the other is necessary, to
provide for more than the minimum discovery rather than less,
especially where no substantial interest of the state in the secrecy
of its evidence, such as that reflected in a work product,38 grand
jury,39 or informer privilege, is thereby compromised. The wisest
jurisdictions will eliminate even this mild corruption by expanding
their defense discovery and thereby removing a temptation
stemming only from the defendant's legitimate concern for seeking
out the evidence needed to defend himself.
Reciprocity and the Prosecutor's Formal Discovery
The prosecutorial discovery involved in Wardius was nar-
rowly limited to the single defense of alibi. Examples of other
special defenses that would presumably be subject to similar
37 See Nakell 500-02, 508-09; cf. Williams v. Florida, 899 U.S. 78 (1972);
Griffin v. California, 880 U.S. 609 (1965).
38 See Nakell 469-70.
3 9 See id. at 477-78.
[Vol 62.
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reciprocal disclosure obligations include self-defense, 40 insanity, 41
and impotency 42 defenses. In addition, forms of prosecutorial dis-
covery not confined to any particular defense are achieving wide-
spread popularity. Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure has served as a model for such provisions. 3 Rule
16(c) has a reverse reciprocity requirement in that it conditions
prosecutorial discovery on the granting of discovery to a de-
fendant, rather than vice-versa as in the Florida notice-of-alibi
rule. Rules 16(a) and (b) provide for defense discovery of the
defendant's own statements, the results or reports of physical or
mental examinations or scientific tests or experiments made in
connection with the case, and other material, books, papers,
documents, and tangible objects, buildings or places, without
regard to whether the prosecution intends to introduce them
into evidence. On a reciprocity basis Rule 16(c) entitles the prosecu-
tion, ostensibly in the discretion of the trial court, to discover cer-
tain evidence that the defendant intends to produce at the trial,
including scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents,
and tangible objects. The rule does not provide for the discovery
of the names of witnesses, and it specifically excludes from dis-
covery the statements of witnesses and the work product of the
defense attorney.44
Two interesting features of Rule 16 should be noted. First, it
can be invoked only at the pleasure of the defendant. Unless the
defendant requests discovery the prosecution is not entitled to
any. Presumably this characteristic of the rule was adopted as a
protection against fifth amendment challenge." It certainly is
not necessary for Wardius due process purposes. Undoubtedly,
Wardius would be satisfied as long as the defendant is given
discovery regardless of whether it is given independently of the
40 E.g., MONr. PEV. Conrs AssN. § 95-1803(d).
4 2 Eg JonesSuprirCort632 2d919,2'Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
43 SeNel49,&n.5-6
4 4 Beas it ujc atrsoei rae ntentc-falibi rule,
rule 16(c a as it mnmn rbesbyn hs eovdi Williams
v. Flor tted rule
16(c), with dissenting votes on fifth amendment grounds by Justices Black and
Douglas, Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 272, 276,
278 (1966), it has never passed on its constitutionality in a judicial framework. In
fact, Wardius and Williams represent the state of the law on prosecutorial discovery
as far as the Supreme Court is concerned.45 See Nakell 502-10.
1973]
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prosecutor's discovery or packaged with it on a reciprocal basis.
A proposed amendment to Rule 16 would eliminate the reciprocal
character of prosecutorial discovery and provide a right to such
discovery independent of any request for discovery by the de-
fendant.46 Such an amendment would make the rule parallel
with notice-of-alibi statutes in terms of initiating the discovery
process with disclosures by the defendant. Whatever fifth amend-
ment concerns that might provoke, as long as the rule continues
to provide equivalent discovery to the defendant it would con-
tinue to meet the due process requirements of Wardius.
The second interesting feature of Rule 16 is that it limits
prosecutorial discovery to evidence "which the defendant intends
to produce at the trial," while not imposing the same limitation
on defense discovery. The limitation on prosecutorial discovery
avoids violation of the defendant's fifth amendment and perhaps
also fourth amendment rights;4'7 yet wisely, the rule imposes the
limitation only to the extent constitutionally necessary and does
not impose it on defense discovery just because constitutional con-
siderations require it for prosecutorial discovery. This does, how-
ever, suggest a question: if a defendant, on fifth amendment
grounds, blocks prosecutorial discovery of evidence the defendant
does not intend to use at trial-presumably because it is incriminat-
ing or ambiguous-could the state satisfy Wardius if it similarly
limits defense discovery? For example, could Oregon satisfy
Wardius by providing for defense discovery of all the alibi rebut-
tal evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial, but not
of evidence he plans not to use, assuming he can tell the difference
in advance of trial?
The question may be academic. If the prosecutor has evidence
relevant to the case that he does not intend to use, presumably
it is either helpful to the defense or useless to both parties. To
the extent the evidence is exculpatory, it would be subject to
mandatory disclosure under the Giles-Brady principle of due
process.48 To the extent the evidence is useless, it is difficult to
conceive how any principle of fairness would be violated by its
nondisclosure.
46 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 547, 591, 596 (1970).
47 See Nakell 500-02.
4 8 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, giving a broad dimension to the Wardius
rule would serve defendant's discovery interests considerably.
It would mean that the defendant could require the prosecutor
to divulge all relevant non-privileged 49 evidence in his possession,
at least if it relates to the same subject matter as prosecutorial
discovery."o Thus, the defendant would no longer be dependent
upon the prosecutor's determination of whether evidence in his
possession would be useful to the defendant. Because the prosecu-
tor is not privy to the nuances of the defendant's case and is
generally too busy with the preparation of his and other cases
to evaluate evidence from the defendant's perspective,51 requiring
disclosure of all relevant evidence in the prosecutor's possession
would yield fruitful information for many defendants. The re-
ports are replete with cases in which prosecutors were unable to
recognize the defense potential of evidence coming to their
attention.52 Even inadmissible evidence may lead to admissible
evidence or provide background for cross-examination of prosecu-
tion witnesses. At the same time, the prosecution would seem to
have no legitimate objection to delivering to the defendant
information it considers useless, as long as the prosecution is
protected against being required to turn over evidence seriously
subject to abuse. For the most part, it is unlikely that evidence
judged useless by the prosecution would lead to intimidation,
bribery or harassment of witnesses by the defendant.
If the Wardius reciprocal discovery rule is merely a tit-for-tat
exchange policy, mutual limitations of discovery to evidence
proposed by either side for use at trial would meet the due
process standard. The Court's "poker game" simile suggests
49 The prosecutor's work product should certainly be privileged. See Nakell
469-70. In addition, the prosecutor should have a privilege against disclosure of
the identity of a witness if he establishes "at an adversary hearing that there is
probable cause to believe that a defendant should not be trusted with such
evidence because of the danger of intimidation, bribery, or harassment of wit-
nesses," and no protective order less drastic than complete withholding of discovery
would protect against the danger. Nakell 448-49. Presumably, the Supreme Court
had this in mind when it wrote in Wardius: "[We do hold that in the absence
of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way
street." Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212 (1973) (emphasis added). Of
course, in some cases the prosecution may be able to resist discovery "only by
dismissing the charges against the defendant, since it may thereby be precluding
him from effective preparation of a defense." Nakell 471. See Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957).
5o See text at notes 57-60 infra.
51 See Nakell 457-59.52 See id. at 453-57, 459-60.
KENTucicy LAW JouRNAL[Vl6
just such an approach: each player is entitled to see only the
number of cards in the other player's hand as he himself shows.
Yet, taking Wardius in conjunction with the Giles-Brady dis-
closure requirement, due process would not seem to be limited
to strictly tit-for-tat discovery because the limitations on prosecu-
torial discovery are founded in part on constitutional policies not
applicable to the prosecution. Otherwise, the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination would become "an excuse for a
diminution of the defendant's chances to get evidence to clear
himself."
53
Reciprocity and the Prosecutor's Investigative Discovery
Beyond formal discovery, a prosecutor has a wealth of investi-
gative discovery devices that enable him to gather evidence in
a criminal case.54 These devices range from informal citizen
cooperation with police investigations to compulsory processes,
many of which may be directed against the defendant:
After conforming to appropriate constitutional standards, the
prosecution may search the person or property of the ac-
cused and seize oral, documentary, or other physical evidence
to use in its prosecution against him. Under appropriate con-
stitutional safeguards and with the consent of the accused,
the prosecution may interrogate him before a grand jury or in
the police station. The prosecution may gather evidence from
within the private enclave of the defendant by electronic
eavesdropping and wiretapping or by insinuating an under-
cover agent into his confidence. The accused may be com-
pelled to exhibit his body, assume poses, and put on or take
off clothes for identification in a fairly conducted lineup; to
provide exemplars of his handwriting for identification; to
53Id. at 444.
54 See id. at 439-42; Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16,
85 HAnv. L. REv. 994, 1018-19 (1972).
55 Nakell 441-42. In Cupp v. Murphy, 93 S.Ct. 2000 (1973), the Supreme
Court last term upheld police action in taking fingernail scrapings without a
warrant from the estranged husband of a recent strangulation victim after noticing
a dark spot on one of his fingers and after he appeared to be surreptitiously cleaning
his nails.
In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), and United States v. Mara,
410 U.S. 19 (1973), the Court validated the authority of grand juries without any
preliminary showing of reasonableness to command criminal suspects to speak for
voice exemplars and to write for handwriting exemplars.
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provide fingerprints for identification; and to speak for voice
identification. The prosecution may obtain samples of his
blood, breath, or urine for scientific analysis n5
What rights does the due process rationale of Wardius give to a
defendant subjected to the prosecutor's investigative discovery?
In analyzing the fairness demands for reciprocity, compulsory
prosecutorial discovery through police investigative powers differs
in one respect from compulsory prosecutorial discovery through
formal or non-police procedures such as a notice-of-alibi rule.
The difference is that investigative discovery is not limited to
evidence that the defendant intends to introduce. In a superficial
sense, this difference serves to distinguish Wardius and would
seem to eliminate the need for the reciprocity rule in relation
to investigative discovery. The prosecutor is not exploiting the
defendant's compelled cooperation to fortify his attack on the
defendant's case. Instead, he is merely developing his case-in-
chief with the discovered information. Thus, the "poker game'
analogy of Wardius is not appropriate; only the prosecutor is
holding undisclosed cards. Furthermore, the prosecutor is not
going to "surprise" the defendant with evidence obtained from
him. The police necessarily disclose to a defendant most-but not
all-of the evidence they obtain from him. Thus, if there is a
duty of disclosure, it is met by the defendant's knowledge that
his statement has been taken, that his person or his property
has been searched, that he has been viewed in a lineup, or that
he has provided exemplars of his speech or handwriting.
The shallowness of this view should be evident. The pros-
ecutor is gaining greater advantage, not less, by acquiring evi-
dence that he can use affirmatively against the defendant rather
than evidence that only sends him scurrying for rebuttal informa-
tion. To the extent that the prosecutor obtains the details of his
case from the defendant, the same considerations of fairness that
triumphed in Wardius should demand reciprocal disclosures
from the prosecutor. Perhaps with this general concept in mind,
the Court in Wardius acknowledged the prosecutor's investigative
discovery50 and declared more broadly than required for resolu-
tion of the issue before it: "[W]e do hold that in the absence of
56 Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212-13 n.9 (1973).
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a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery
must be a two-way street."57
57 Id. at 2212. The Court preceded the quoted language by saying, "we do
not suggest that the Due Process Clause of its own force requires Oregon to adopt
such [reciprocal discovery] provisions. Cf. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S.
348 (1969); Cicenia v. Lagay, 857 U.S. 504 (1958)." Id. at 2212. By the same
approach, the argument in the text proceeds not from the due process clause
decreeing disclosure in a vacuum but rather as a reciprocal matter.
The Court at the same time did not suggest that due process does not or
could not require defense discovery independently of prosecutorial discovery. The
two cases cited by the Court with a "Cf." signal would be weak support for any
such proposition. See Nakell 451-52 nn.84 & 88. Augenbliclc was a suit for back
pay by a dishonorably discharged soldier who had been convicted in a court-
martial of an indecent act. His complaint that the court-martial was unfair was
based on his failure to obtain a copy of handwritten notes and tape recordings of
an early police interview with the plaintiff's partner in the indecent act, who
became a government witness. The law officer granted a motion for production
of the tape recordings and denied a motion for production of the notes. However,
the defendant never got the tape recordings because the officers testified they did
not know what happened to them. The plaintiff thought the officer who took the
notes should have been called as a witness on the question of what happened to
the tape recordings, but he had been transferred and was not called.
The principal issue in the case was whether the civilian courts could entertain
such a claim. On the secondary discovery issue, the Court observed that it did
not know enough about the notes to be able to determine whether the .encks Act,
18 U.S.C. § 8500 (1970), required disclosure of them, and that the only question
regarding the tapes was whether one more witness should have been called in
the inquiry into their disappearance. The Court then held in an opinion written
by Justice Douglas:
But questions of that character do not rise to a constitutional level. In-
deed our Jencks decision [Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1967)]
and the Jencks Act were not cast in constitutional terms. Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). They state rules of evidence
governing trials before federal tribunals; and we have never extended
their principles to state criminal trials. It may be that in some situations,
denial of production of a Jencks Act type of a statement might be a
denial of a Sixth Amendment right. There is, for example, the command
of the Sixth Amendment that criminal defendants have compulsory
process to obtain witnesses for their defense. . . . But certain it is that
this case is not a worthy candidate for consideration at the constitutional
level.
Augenblick v. United States, 393 U.S. U.S. 348, 356 (1969).
Cicenia v. Lagay was a case in which the principal issue was whether the
defendant's constitutional rights had been violated by the taking of his confession
while both he and his attorney were asking the police officers to allow them to
meet. The Court's holding on this issue was specifically overruled in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 n.48 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
492 & n.15 (1964).
The secondary discovery issue in the case was the trial courts denial of the
defendant's request for pretrial disclosure of the confessions he and two friends
had given the police. After losing that request, the defendant entered a plea of
non vult contendere. In the circumstances of his conviction upon that plea, the
Supreme Court held that the defendant had suffered no violation of due process.
The facts in Cicenia v. Lagay arguably come within the reciprocity rule in
Wardius as discussed in the text, at least as far as the defendant's own confession
is concerned. The procedural status of the defendants discovery claim confounded
its opportunity for a fair hearing on the merits in the Supreme Court. See Tollett
v. Henderson, 93 S.Ct. 1602 (1973); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1971);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Had the defendant been able to
perfect an interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion, the case might have
(Continued on next page)
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Toward Full File Disclosure:
Reciprocity or Fundamental Fairness?
There are at least three contexts in which due process might
require expanded disclosure by the prosecution. First, although
the defendant may know that he signed a written statement or
that the police seized physical evidence from his home, he may
need to obtain the statement or physical evidence to evaluate
it himself. Second, the defendant needs information about the
prosecution's development of the evidence retrieved by its in-
vestigation. Some of the raw evidence may be obtained in a form
ready for trial use; much of the raw evidence may have to be
evaluated or analyzed before it has significance as proof against
the defendant; much of it may serve also as leads to uncover
further evidence. For example, the prosecution might have
scientifically analyzed suspected narcotics seized from the de-
fendant, or fingernail scrapings taken from him, or blood found
in his car. The prosecutor might have pursued clues in a state-
ment given to the police by the defendant and found witnesses,
documents, or objects to support or refute his story. The prosecutor
might have had expert comparisons of a defendant's handwriting,
voice exemplar, or gun, with a forged note, an intercepted tele-
phone conversation, or a fatal bullet. The prosecution might
have learned whether a witness could identify the defendant in
a lineup or identify items of clothing taken from his house. Does
the reciprocity principle of due process require the prosecution
to disclose evidence developed from information supplied by the
defendant? Does it require the prosecution to share with the
defendant the use of evidence it has taken from him, for his
development of leads or for his independent expert to analyze?
These two contexts deal with exchange of evidence prob-
lems: through its investigative discovery devices, the prosecu-
tion has taken evidence from the defendant, and the defen-
dant is asking for a fair exchange through discovery of what-
ever evidence the prosecution has obtained and developed
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
been in a better posture for the Court to recognize the due process claim. Cf.
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). But see Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786 (1972):
We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make
a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police in-
vestegatory work on a case. Id. at 795.
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from the defendant. The third context goes beyond mutual
exchange and raises questions stemming from the state's inherent
advantage in gathering information. Will due process afford the
defendant broader discovery than tit-for-tat and place the state's
evidence at the disposal of the defendant regardless of the
source of the evidence? Is it fundamentally fair to counter-
balance the state's greater evidence gathering powers by giving
the defense discovery rights to the prosecution's files?
However phrased, the question is how much the due process
right established in Wardius depends upon the matching of dis-
covery, category for category, issue for issue. If reciprocity is the
theory of the right, a defendant may be denied discovery if the
prosecution makes no investigative discovery from the defendant,
possibly because it has a sufficient case from other sources. Since
neither party is exploiting the other, denying defense discovery
may not seem unfair in reciprocity terms even though the
defendant may be unprepared at trial to meet the undisclosed
case against him.
The prosecutor's investigative discovery might deal with
factual aspects of the case the defendant does not propose
to contest. With regard to the issue on which the defendant
is positing his defense, however, the prosecutor may have in-
dependently acquired information. If the reciprocity theory is
limited to subject matter tit-for-tat, the defendant may be denied
access to the information bearing on his defense on the ground
that it is unrelated to the subject matter of the evidence obtained
through the investigative discovery.
For example, the prosecutor might have obtained a gun
belonging to the defendant during a search of his home. Ballistics
tests may establish that gun as the one that fired a bullet found
in the victim. The defendant may not dispute that his gun killed
the victim, but instead may argue that he did not wield the gun
at the time of the killing, or that the killing was accidental or in
self-defense. In such a situation, the defendant might have no
use for discovery of the gun or the ballistics test. He might, how-
ever, have a critical need for the names of any eyewienesses to
the event or reports of the condition of the body. Should the
prosecutor be permitted to withhold such information while
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gathering ballistics evidence from the defendant to use against
him?
For another example, in one rape case the prosecutor might
have obtained all of his evidence from the victim, from her
physician, and from her home. In another rape case, the pros-
ecutor might also have required the defendant to participate in
a lineup and might have found items belonging to the victim in
a search of the defendant's home.
Should there be any difference in the discovery rights of the
defendant in those two cases? In either case, should the defendant
be entitled to discovery of the doctor's report or of physical
evidence, found in the victim's home? A tit-for-tat limitation
enforced on a case-by-case basis would deny all discovery to the
first rape defendant, and require discovery in favor of the second
rape defendant only of the items taken from his home and the
results of the lineup. A defendant's due process discovery rights
would thus vary, not according to his needs or according to the
danger of his misuse of evidence, but according to the accident
of how much information was obtained-or attempted to be ob-
tained-from him or his property in the particular case. Often,
as in the murder and second rape examples above, the disclosures
will only tease the defendant, but this limitation, however illogical
from the defendant's perspective, will be faithful to the principle
of reciprocity on which it depends.
These last considerations go only to the scope of the de-
fendant's discovery rights as responsive to the subject matter
of the investigative discovery. By not limiting defense discovery
to the subject matter of the investigative discovery, the reciproc-
ity principle of Wardius can form the basis for full file disclosure
if any information is given to the prosecution by the defendant.
If discovery rights are not to be determined by the fortu-
itousness of how strong a case the prosecution can make from
outside sources, fundamental fairness, the heart of the Wardius
decision, may eventually require full file disclosure for all relevant
non-privileged information in the files of the police and prosecu-
tor.58 Obviously, this analysis proceeds beyond the narrow hold-
58 A formal reciprocal requirement on the defendant could be established by
(Continued on next page)
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ing in Wardius. Taking note of the prosecutor's investigative
discovery, however, the Court observed in Wardius: "Indeed, the
State's inherent information gathering advantages suggest that
if there is to be any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work
in the defendant's favor." 9 The Court then hinted at the potential
for developing a general constitutional right to defense discovery
in the form of file disclosure when it wrote that due process
"does speak to the balance of forces between the accused and his
accuser."
60
DFPosrrioNs
The preliminary or probable cause hearing, when provided,
is the stage of the criminal process that supplies a defendant
with his only pre-trial opportunity for compulsory process to
interrogate witnesses unwilling to talk to him voluntarily, that
is, for depositions. 61 The Supreme Court held in Coleman v.
Alabama62 that the preliminary hearing is a critical stage of the
criminal process at which an indigent defendant is entitled to
appointed counsel. In reaching that holding, the Court empha-
sized the discovery potential of the preliminary hearing.e The
Court also held in Roberts v. LaVallee6 4 that an indigent de-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
state law, but it might more often be defeated by privilege, especially the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, than would the prosecutor's
obligation.
When the Court in Wardius said that "discovery must be a two-way street"
presumably it did not mean that due process might itself impose disclosure
obligations on a defendant. The fourteenth amendment applies only to the states
and not of its own force to private persons.
59 Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212 n.9 (1973).
60 Id. at 2212.61 Four states provide criminal defendants with a right to discovery depositions.
FLA. R. CaM. P. 1.220(f); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.50 (Page Supp. 1970);
State ex rel. fackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 224 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio 1967);
TEx. CODE Cnnv. P. arts. 39.02-.07 (Vernon 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1972); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §§ 6721-26 (Supp. 1971); State v. Mahoney, 176 A.2d 747
(Vt. 1961); Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J.732 (1967).
62399 u.S. 1 (1970).
63 Two of the four functions the Court found that counsel could perform at a
preliminary hearing related to discovery. The Court described them as follows:
[T]he skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can
fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the
State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the ac-
cused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. [Also], trained counsel
can more effectively discover the case the State has against his client
and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case
at the trial.
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
64389 U.S. 40 (1967).
CRumNAL DEFENSE DiscovERY
fendant has a right to a free transcript of his preliminary hearing.
Obviously the transcript enables the defendant to take full ad-
vantage of any discovery obtained at the preliminary hearing.65
There are limitations, however, on the usefulness of the
preliminary hearing for discovery. Doctrinally, it has been con-
sidered a screening procedure to determine whether there is
probable cause to hold an accused for trial rather than a discovery
device.66 The court may therefore terminate the preliminary
hearing once probable cause is established.67 Also, the preliminary
hearing may be held at a time when the prosecution has not fully
gathered its evidence and when the defendant has not yet
learned enough about the case to know which witnesses to sub-
poena.6 8 But by far the most important interference with this
discovery opportunity comes from the prosecutor's exercise of
an option available to him in most jurisdictions to substitute a
secret grand jury inquiry for the adversary preliminary hearing.69
Many lower federal court cases have upheld this practice.9
65 Cf. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228 (1971).
66 See Nakell 466-67.67 See Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 282 (1972).
68 See id.
69 See Nakell 467-68.70 United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 1973); See
Nakell 467 n.154.
In dictum in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 389 U.S. 594 (1950), Justice
Douglas wrote the following for the Court:
The impact of the initiation of judicial proceedings is often serious.
Take the case of the grand jury. It returns an indictment against a man
without a hearing. It does not determine his guilt; it only determines
whether there is probable cause to believe he is guilty. But that de-
termination is conclusive on the issue of probable cause. As a result the
defendant can be arrested and held for trial. [Citations] The impact of
an indictment is on the reputation or liberty of a man. The same is true
where a prosecutor files an information charging violations of the law.
The harm to property and business can also be incalculable by the mere
institution of proceedings. Yet it has never been held that the hand of
government must be stayed until the courts have an opportunity to de-
termine whether the government is justified in instituting suit in the
courts.
Id. at 599.
See atso Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 220 (1965). (Under the
federal rules, a preliminary hearing is required "unless before the preliminary
hearing is held, the grand jury supersedes the complaint procedure by returning
an indictment.")
But see Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 545 n.3 (1966): "In the case of
adults, arraignment before a magistrate for determination of probable cause and
advice to the arrested person as to his rights, etc., are provided by law and are
regarded as fundamental. Cf. FED. RuLEs Cnar. PRoc. 5(a), (b); Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)." See alo Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
551 (1966): Petitioner contends that he "was deprived of his liberty for about a
week without a determination of probable cause which would have been required
in the case of an adult, see note 3, supra...."
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Gagnon v. Scarpelli,71 decided last term, which built on Morrissey
v. Brewer,72 decided the previous term, and a host of related
cases, however, hold out promise that the preliminary hearing may
be constitutionally required at least as a screening procedure for
probable cause.
In Gagnon and Morrissey the Supreme Court held that due
process requires that a person whose probation or parole is re-
voked be provided "a preliminary hearing at the time of his
arrest and detention"73 and "a somewhat more comprehensive
hearing prior to the making of the final revocation decision." 4
The due process requirement of a preliminary hearing is the
interesting aspect of these cases for present purposes, and the
critical question for study is the nature of the preliminary hearing
required by due process.
For purposes of parole revocation, Morrissey held that the pre-
liminary hearing must have the following minimum features as
a constitutional imperative:
With respect to the preliminary hearing before this [in-
dependent] officer, the parolee should be given notice that
the hearing will take place and that its purpose is to de-
termine whether there is probable cause to believe he has
committed a parole violation.... At the hearing the parolee
may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring let-
ters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant informa-
tion to the hearing officer. On request of the parolee, persons
who have given adverse information on which parole revoca-
tion is to be based are to be made available for questioning in
his presence. However, if the hearing officer determines that
the informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity
were disclosed, he need not be subjected to confrontation
and cross-examination.
The hearing officer shall have the duty of making a sum-
mary, or digest, of what transpires at the hearing .... [He]
"should state the reasons for his determination and indicate
the evidence he relied on... -75
7193 S.Ct. 1756 (1973).
72 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
73 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973).
74 Id.75 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1972).
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In Gagnon, the Court held that the preliminary hearing
procedural protections mandated in Morrissey for parolees7 6 must
likewise be provided in the preliminary hearing given a previously
sentenced probationer.7 Further, it held that in some cases of
both probation and parole revocation,"8 determined on a flexible
case-by-case basis, the right of an indigent to appointed counsel
must be provided. 9
The preliminary hearing in the criminal process itself contains
all of these procedures, except possibly the requirement that the
decisionmaker "'state the reasons for his determination and
indicate the evidence relied on."' 80 The Supreme Court in Cole-
man observed that in the preliminary hearing of a criminal case,
"the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of wit-
nesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may
lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over."8 Screen-
ing for probable cause was one function counsel could perform
at a preliminary hearing that established the character of the
hearing as a critical stage of the criminal process for which the
"guiding hand of counsel.., is essential."82 Yet without a pre-
liminary hearing, the procedural safeguards required by Gagnon
and Morrissey for probation and parole revocation are not
7GAt the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled to
notice of the alleged violations of probation or parole, an opportunity to
appear and to present evidence in Jais own beha a conditional right to
confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a written
report of the hearing.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1761 (1973).77 In Mempa v. Rhay, 889 U.S. 128 (1967), the Court had already held that
a probation revocation proceeding at which sentencing was also to take p lace
was a critical stage of a criminal proceeding to which the right to counsel at-
tached. The Court in Gagnon distinguished Mempa on the ground that in Gagnon
the probationer had already been sentenced at the time of trial. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973).7 8 Although the Court in Gagnon was presented only with a case of probation
revocation, it wrote its opinion on the right to counsel issue for parole revocation
as well. For example, the Court stated that the second "question posed by this
case is whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a due process right to be
represented by appointed counsel at these hearings." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93
S.Ct. 1756, 1760 (1973) (emphasis added). The Court explained: "Despite the
undoubted minor differences between probation and parole, the commentators have
agreed that revocation of _probation where sentence has been imposed pre-
viously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole.' Id. at
1759, n.3.
9 Id. at 1760-64.80 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972); see also In re Law, 109
Cal. Rptr. 578, 577 (1978).
81 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
82 Id.
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provided a criminal defendant. Instead, the screening responsi-
bility devolves upon a grand jury, which does not give the
defendant a hearing in any real sense.
Grand jury proceedings are conducted in secret.8 3 Only the
grand jurors, the witness being examined, and, in most jurisdic-
tions, the prosecuting attorney are allowed to attend. The de-
fendant need not be given notice of the proceedings or of their
purpose. He has no right to appear before the grand jury except
as a witness at its request. Even then, he is not entitled to have
counsel-appointed or retained-with him in the jury room.
4
He has no right to present witnesses of his own or to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has recently suggested that because of the control
or influence exercised by the prosecutor, the grand jury might
not even meet the requirement of an independent decision-
maker.85
83 E.g., FED. R. Cms. P. 6(d), (e).
84Steele, Right to Counsel at the Grand Jury Stage of Criminal Proceedings,
36 Mo. L. Rzv. 193, 194 (1971).8 5
1n United States v. Dionisio, 401 U.S. 1 (1973), Justice Stewart writing
for the majority said: "The grand u may not always serve its historic role as a
protective bulwark standing solidly beeen the ordinary citizen and an overzealous
prosecutor .. " Id. at 17. Justice Marshall was more explicit in his dissenting
opinion: Whatever the present day validity of the historical assumption of
neutrality that underlies the grand jury process, it must at least be
recognized that if a grand jury is deprived of the independence essential
to the assumption of neutrality-if it effectively surrenders that inde-
pendence to a prosecutor-the dangers of excessive and unreasonable
official interference with personal liberty are exactly those that the
Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent.
Id. at 46.
Justice Douglas also addressed this point:
Judge William Campbell, who has been on the District Court in
Chicago for over 32 years, recently made the following indictment against
the grand jury:
"This great institution of the past has long ceased to be the guardian
of the people for which purpose it was created at Runnymede. Today it
is but a convenient tool for the prosecutor-too often used solely for
publicity. Any experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict
anybody at any time for almost anything before any grand jury."
Id. at 23. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971).
The applicability of these comments to any particular grand jury may vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and some grand juries may exercise more inde-
pendence than others. For example, some states may not even permit the
prosecutor to attend grand jury proceedings, Watts, Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog
or Expensive Antique?, 37 N.C.L. Rxv. 290, 305 (1959), although he may still
exercise control over the grand jury by regulating the cases that are brought
before it and the evidence that is presented to it.
Even in a jurisdiction where the grand jury is neutral and independent of the
prosecutor, its proceedings still do not provide the defendant with the procedural
(Continued on next page)
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Thus, the grand jury is primarily an investigation and charging
institution. In performing these functions, the grand jury may
operate as a buffer or bulwark between the government and the
citizens, protecting against harassment and unfounded prosecu-
tion.80 Yet because it does not afford the defendant the pro-
cedural rights to notice, to be heard, to present witnesses, to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, to counsel, and to a state-
ment of reasons for any determination against him, the grand
jury proceeding does not qualify as the criminal trial equivalent
of the due process preliminary hearing the Constitution requires
before a person may have his parole or probation revoked.
Though the grand jury theoretically may be expected to, and at
times actually may, block careless, overzealous, or malicious
prosecutions, institutionally it lacks every fundamental due pro-
cess procedure by which it might be expected to determine
probable cause on any reliable basis. The grand jury's investigat-
ing and charging functions probably preclude its being tailored
to due process hearing standards. The grand jury may not know
who, as a defendant, should be provided the procedural rights
until "the end of the investigation when all the evidence has
been received."17 Thus, the grand jury's investigative responsi-
bilities"' usually render it unsuited for satisfying the commands
of procedural due process in determining probable cause.
Recognizing the constitutional deficiencies of the grand jury
proceeding in terms of the minimal attributes of a due process
hearing does not detract from the grand jury's historical bulwark
or buffer purpose. It also does not interfere with the investigative
usefulness of the grand jury. Because of its institutional short-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
rights required by Gagnon and Morrisey. Therefore, a grand jury in such a
jurisdiction does not provide a defendant with a constitutionally sufficient screening
process, to the extent that the procedures required for parole and probation
revocation hearings may also be required for criminal trials.
86 See Wood v. Georgia, 870 U.S. 875, 890 (1962); Hoffman v. United States,
841 U.S. 479, 485 (1951); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11 (1887).
87 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). See also Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 278 (1918): "[T]he identity of the offender, and the precise
nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion of
the grand jury's labors, not at the beginning." Id. at 282. Of course, this is true
only of the investigative grand jury as opposed to the routine grand jury asked to
return an indictment after law enforcement officers have done all the in-
vestigating.
89See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8, 18 (1978); Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448 (1972).
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comings however, the grand jury alone is not a sufficient protec-
tion for the citizen against deprivation of his liberty pending a fall
trial, and a preliminary hearing with the full trappings of
due process must be provided in addition to-or instead of, at
the option of the states9-the grand jury proceeding.
Gagnon and Morrisey were decided amidst a number of
recent cases that extended due process protections to deprivations
of governmental benefits, and summary processes in aid of judg-
ment, on the well-established and fundamental principle that
before the state may deprive a person of liberty or property, he
must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard 0 Until
recently, due process required a hearing only when the deprivation
of a right was involved, and not when a privilege or a gratuity
was taken." The recent cases, however, abolished only the right-
privilege distinction;92 the concept of procedural due process
that was applied was "in the mainstream of past cases."
93
In the main, the recent due process cases involved situations
in which the state did provide a hearing at some stage of the case
to determine the legality of a taking from a party. The Supreme
Court held, however, that due process was not satisfied unless
there was a hearing before the taking."4 In Sniadach v. Family
89 The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unletss on a p)resentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury ... " This provision applies to the federal government only, and
not to the states. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Lem Woon v.
Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
90Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a
minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing ap-
propriate to the nature of the case.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). See
also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 371-78 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965).
91 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 H~Av. L. REv. 1439 (1968).92 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 85-90 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970);
Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 & n.9 (1972).
93 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82, 88 (1972).
94 InBoddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Supreme Court said
that the root requirement [of due urocess is] that an individual be given an
opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.
Id. at 379.
In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), the Court held that the
divorced father of a young girl was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be
heard before his parental rights could be terminated by adoption of the girl by
(Continued on next page)
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Finance Corp. of Bay View,95 the Court held that summary pre-
judgment garnishment procedures violated due process where
the garnishment was accomplished simply by application of
an alleged creditor. Although a subsequent hearing on the
merits of the claim would settle entitlement to the garnisheed
funds the Court held that due process was violated because
the "sole opportunity to be heard comes after the taking."98
In Fuentes v. Shevin9 7 the Court expanded the Sniadach rule
by invalidating most summary pre-judgment seizures, attach-
ments, or replevin actions against personal property where hear-
ings were available only after seizure. The Court said: "If the
right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it
is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation
can still be prevented."98 On the same basis in Goldberg v. Kelly 9
the Court struck down welfare termination procedures that in-
cluded a hearing only after the termination of benefits. In Bell v.
Burson 00 the Court held unconstitutional a state provision for
suspending the driver's license of an uninsured motorist who is
involved in an accident and fails to post security for damages.
The Court ruled that without an inquiry to determine the reason-
able possibility that judgment in the amount of damages claimed
would be rendered against the uninsured motorist, his license
could not be suspended.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau0 1 and Perry v. Sinderman0 2 were
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
her stepfather. The Court held that a hearing on the father's petition to set aside
the adoption decree was not an adequate due process substitute because the decree
had already been entered. The Court said:
A fundamental requirement of due process is the 'opportunity to be
heard.' [Citation.] It is an opportunity which must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The trial court could have
fully accorded this right to the petitioner only by granting his motion to
set aside the decree and consider the case anew. Only that would have
wiped the slate clean. Only that would have restored the petitioner to
the position he would have occupied had due process of law been ac-
corded to him in the first place.
Id. at 552. See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
95 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
96 Snidach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
97 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
9
8 Id. at 81.
99 397 U.S. 254, 259-60 (1970). See also Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S.
280 (1970) (companion case).
106402 U.S. 535 (1971). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
101 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
102408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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cases in which no hearing was provided. In Constantineau, a
police chief, pursuant to state law and without notice to the
plaintiff, posted a notice in all retail liquor outlets that sales or
gifts of liquor to the plaintiff were forbidden for one year. The
Court held: "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."10 3 In
Sinderman, the Court held that a junior college teacher employed
on a one-year contract basis could, depending on the facts, acquire
a "'property interest in reemployment" entitling him to a due
process hearing before he could be discharged.
04
Following these decisions, Gagnon and Morrissey announced
that a probationer or a parolee faced with threatened revocation
of his conditional liberty is entitled not only to a hearing on the
question of his violating the conditions of his release, but also to
a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe he violated one of those conditions. 0 5 The
"arrest and detention" of the probationer or parolee creates the
need for a preliminary hearing'0 6 since, as the Court assumed,
there would be a time lag between this event and the final
determination of whether probation or parole should be re-
voked,10 7 the Court noting that a lapse of two months before the
final hearing "would not appear to be unreasonable." 08 Without
discussion, the Court understandably departed from the due
process cases on which it relied: it did not require a hearing
before the probationer or parolee was arrested. That is, the
Court did not insist upon the requirement that a hearing precede
any deprivation of liberty. Instead, it held that due process would
be satisfied by a hearing "conducted at or reasonably near the
place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly
as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources
are available.0 9 The Court thus indicated that a hearing must
103 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
104 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972); of. Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
'0 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759, 1764 (1973); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
106 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 98 S.Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
107 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
108 Id. at 488.
109 Id. at 485.
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be held before any significant transfer of the alleged violator,
and the fact that it required a preliminary hearing when a delay
of only two months was expected between arrest and final hearing
perhaps indicates the Court's conception of a very short time
between the arrest and the required preliminary hearing.
The Court's relaxation of the prior hearing stricture is con-
sistent with a longstanding "emergency exception" that justifies
a brief delay before holding a hearing if only property rights
are concerned."' The exception does not remove the hearing
requirement; it only postpones the time within which it must be
met."' In Fuentes v. Shevin the Court described the "emergency
exception" as follows:
110 Justice Brandeis in 1931 summarized the emergency cases that had been
decided up until that time as follows:
The right of the United States to collect its internal revenue by sum-
mary administrative proceedings has long been settled. Where, as here,
adequate opportunity is afforded for a later judicial determination of the
legal rights summary proceedings to secure prompt performance of
pecuniary obligations to the government have been consistently sustained.
[Citations.] Property rights must yield provisionally to governmental need.
... Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the
judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given
for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate. [Cita-
tions.] Delay in the judicial determination of property rights is not
uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be immediately
satisfied. For the protection of public health, a state may order the sum-
mary destruction of property by administrative authorities without ante-
cedent notice or hearing. [Citations.] Because of the public necessity, the
property of citizens may be summarily seized in war-time. [Citations.]
And at any time, the United States may acquire property by eminent
domain, without paying or determining the amount of the compensation
before the taking.
Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 595-97 (1931).
In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry 339 U.S. 594 (1950), the Court upheld
multiple seizures of harmless drugs marketed under exaggerated and misleading
advertising, under the emergency authority for "summary destruction of property
without prior notice or hearing for the protection of public health." Id. at 599-600.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas said: "It is sufficient where only property
rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and
a judicial determination." Id. at 599.
In Fahey v. Mallonee 332 U.S. 245 (1947), the Court upheld action by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Commission in taking over a savings and loan
association on the ground that its management was injurious to members, creditors,
and the public. The Court said:
It is complained that these regulations provide for hearing after the
conservator takes possession instead of before. This is a drastic procedure.
But the delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of pre-
serving credit during an investigation has made it an almost invariable
custom to apply supervisory authority in this summary manner.
Id. at 253.
"' That the hearing required by due process is subject to waiver,
and is not fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an indi-
vidual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any
significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where
(Continued on next page)
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There are "extraordinary situations" that justify postponing
notice and opportunity for a hearing. . . . These situations,
however, must be truly unusual. Only in a few limited situ-
ations has this Court allowed outright seizure without oppor-
tunity for a prior hearing. First, in each case, the seizure has
been directly necessary to secure an important governmental
or general public interest. Second, there has been a special
need for very prompt action. Third.... the person initiating
the seizure has been a government official responsible for de-
termining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute,
that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.
1 2
Arrest of a probationer or parolee suspected of violating the
conditions of his release involves not property, but liberty. Other-
wise, the arrest meets all three "extraordinary situation" require-
ments listed in Fuentes. The fourth amendment specifically ad-
dresses the prerequisites for constitutional arrest and contains no
requirement for a prior adversary hearing." 3 Thus, Gagnon and
Morrissey contemplated that arrest might be effected without a
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the
hearing until after the event.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
"12 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972).
113 The fourth amendment does apply to arrests of persons as well as to
searches of property. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). In Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480-83, 510-11, 511-12 n.1, 524 (1971), Justice Stewart
for the plurality and Justice White for the dissenters debated without resolving
Justice White's proposition that an arrest upon probable cause may always be
effected without a warrant-that is, without a prior ex parte hearing before a
magistrate.
In Fuentes v. Shevin the Court noted:
The seizure of possessions under a writ of replevin is entirely dif-
ferent from the seizure of possessions under a search warrant. First, a
search warrant is generally issued to serve a highly important govern-
mental need-e.g., the apprehension and conviction of criminals-rather
than the mere private advantage of a private party in an economic
transaction. Second, a search warrant is generally issued in situations
demanding prompt action. The danger is all too obvious that a criminal
will destroy or hide evidence or fruits of his crime if given any rior
notice. Third, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that the State will not
issue search warrants merely upon the conclusory application of a private
party. It guarantees that the State will not abdicate control over the
issuance of warrants and that no warrant will be issued without a prior
showing of probable cause. Thus, our decision today in no way implies
that there must be opportunity for an adversary hearing before a search
warrant is issued.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93-94 n.30 (1972).
Of course, some form of prior hearing, though ex poarte, is ordinarily required
for a search and seizure of property: (Continued on next page)
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hearing, but commanded that the ensuing detention be subject
to a hearing "as promptly as convenient."
The implications for the criminal process stand out clearly."-4
At an early stage of a criminal case the defendant is typically
arrested and detained pending trial, unless he can post bail or
meet some other condition for pretrial release. Obviously the
defendant who must await trial in jail has been deprived of his
liberty by summary and not due process unless he is given a
preliminary hearing on the issue of probable cause. A state could
not take a person's household goods or furniture,"' his driver's
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-sub-
ject only to a few specifically established and carefully delineated ex-
ceptions." The exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn," and there
must be a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the exigencies
of the situation made that course imperative. •"[Tihe burden is on those
seeking the exemption to show the need for it."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
After the search is conducted, if property is seized the defendant will have an
opportunitv for a hearing on the lawfulness of that seizure. United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Steele v. United States 267 U.S. 498
(1925); United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967); of. People v.
Mitchell, 258 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970); People v. Bak, 258
N.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970). We are dealing with the seizure
of a person rather than of property when we deal with an arrest. As discussed
in the text, the form of the procedures required by due process may be more
stringent when liberty rather than property is being deprived.
In any event, Gagnon and Morrissey explicitly held that a probationer or
parolee has a right to a hearing promptly after his arrest and detention for pos-
sible revocation of his liberty status. Those cases would seem to settle the
proposition that after arrest in the criminal process as well a defendant is entitled
to a preliminary hearing.1
14 
I n Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-54, 561-62 (1966), the
Supreme Court held that it was unlawful for a District of Columbia juvenile court
to waive its jurisdiction over a minor and refer him to be tried in an adult court
without a hearing and a statement of reasons. For this result, the Court relied
on interpretation of a statute, id. at 556, by ruling that the statute "assumes
procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process and fairness." Id. at 553. See also id. at 557: "We
believe this result is required by the statute read in the context of constitutional
principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel." This decision
as een applied to state juvenile proceedings. E.g., Kemplen v. Maryland, 428
F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970).
In Kent the Court held:
We do not decide whether, on the merits, Kent should have been trans-
ferred; but there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of
such tremendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing,
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.
It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults, with respect
to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner. Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
115 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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license, 1 6 his good name and reputation," 7 his welfare benefits," 8
the use of his salary,1 9 or his public employment,120 without
giving him a preliminary hearing. Yet the defendant can be kept
in jail as long as it takes to complete his trial-often months,
sometimes years-on the sole basis of a secret proceeding by a
grand jury, who may not hear his evidence, whose witnesses and
other evidence he may not confront, who give no reasons and cite
no evidence for their decision, and who are generally controlled
by the officer charged with the prosecution. In the process, the
defendant can lose his family, his property, his job, and his good
name. But because of the mystique of the grand jury, he is denied
the fundamental elements of due process.
It is cruelly ironic that the criminal justice process, which
threatens the accused's right to liberty, is wanting in the basic
procedural features that jealously safeguard the right to hold
property. Extending the protection of a preliminary hearing to
arrested probationers and parolees certainly presages an extension
as well to the presumptively innocent prisoner languishing in jail
only because he has been charged with crime and who has never
been given a hearing on even the probability of his guilt or in-
nocence. Indeed, in Morrissey the Court intimated that the pro-
tections it was ordering for parole revocations were less than those
required for a criminal prosecution.
121
Since the event triggering the right to a hearing is the arrest
and detention of the accused, a plausible argument can be ad-
vanced that the right to hearing does not apply to a defendant
released pre-trial on bail or on nonmonetary conditions. Since
Gagnon and Morrissey permitted the due process hearing in the
revocation context to take place promptly after, and not neces-
sarily before, arrest, the pre-trial release of a defendant would
obviate any need for a preliminary hearing. This argument
"16 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
1i7 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
118 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"19 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1972).
320 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
121 "We begin with the proposition that the revocation of parole is not part
of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in
such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations .... Parole arises after the
end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence.' Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756,
1759 (1973).
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would advance discrimination against the poor and friend-
less. Strategically, it might encourage defendants to delay posting
bail until after they have been provided a preliminary hearing.
Doctrinally, the due process cases have already rejected such a
distinction. The summary garnishment, replevin, and license sus-
pension procedures in Snidach, Fuentes, and Bell v. Burson, al-
lowed the defendant to retrieve his property by posting a bond.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the taking could not be accom-
plished without a prior hearing. In a criminal case, pre-trial
release generally encompasses restrictions on liberty not imposed
on the ordinary citizen, such as geographical restraints. Such
restrictions may be as burdensome on the individual as the
suspension of a driver's license in Bell v. Burson or the loss of
sometimes unessential property described in the other due process
cases. Moreover, the mere fact of arrest adversely affects reputa-
tion in a manner similar to that involved in the no-liquor posting
in Wisconsin v. Constantineau. Thus, irrational results could be
avoided by holding that any arrest, even if the defendant is
released pending trial, constitutes a sufficient deprivation to in-
voke the right to a due process hearing.
The hearing required by due process before a state may
deprive a person of liberty or property need not necessarily ap-
proach the character of a trial. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands. '[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may
require under any given set of circumstances must begin with
a determination of the precise nature of the governmental function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action.""12 2 In Gagnon and Morrissey the Court
described the features of the preliminary hearing required by
due process for the revocation of probation and parole. In Gold-
berg v. Kelly the Court specified similar safeguards, except the
right to counsel, for the pre-termination hearing in a welfare case.
Certainly the preliminary hearing in the criminal context should
122 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See also Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-67 (1970). "[A]
weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing
requred in particular situations by procedural due process." Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
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conform, at minimum, to the requirements imposed in those
cases. The parole revocation and welfare termination procedures
are completely administrative in character, and an administrative
decisionmaker at the preliminary hearing was held acceptable to
due process. 123 Thus, since the criminal trial is wholly judicial,
the preliminary hearing should be before a judicial officer. It is
not clear from the cases, however, that the pre-seizure hearings
required by Sniadach and Fuentes, and the preliminary hearing
called for by Gagnon, are to be held before a judge. In the crimi-
nal case, the private interest affected by the governmental action
is so serious that as long as the proceedings are in a judicial
forum, the balance would seem to weigh heavily in favor of a
non-administrative preliminary hearing in the criminal process.
The question of whether an absolute right to counsel applies at
a preliminary hearing in a criminal case has already been resolved
in favor of the right.
124
CONCLUSION
The preliminary hearing is provided by the states and required
by due process for screening purposes and not for discovery. Dis-
covery is, however, a necessary incidental benefit of the pre-
liminary hearing, and the Supreme Court in Coleman sanctioned
its use for that purpose, within the framework and inherent
limitations of the preliminary hearing. By holding out promise
for deposition procedures and expanded reciprocal discovery, the
due process clause provides the cornerstone for criminal defense
discovery equivalent to what is routinely available to all litigants
in civil trials. When the promise is implemented, the course of
justice will run more smoothly, efficiently, fairly and reliably.
123 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972).
124 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
